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HORSE RACING AND THE LAW: A
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO HARNESS
RACE-FIXING
Bradley S. Telias*
I. Introduction
Recent investigations of race-fixing schemes in thoroughbred
racing have focused public attention on the sport historically re-
ferred to as the "Sport of Kings."' These investigations, however,
have done little to enhance racing's integrity. In fact, there are in-
dications that the nation's leading spectator sport for more than a
quarter of a century is now on the decline.2 The significance of de-
* Former Secretary to the New York State Racing and Wagering Board. B.A., The City
College of New York. J.D., Fordham University School of Law. The author is presently a
Public Affairs officer for the Power Authority of the State of New York.
1. Some historians consider the best account of the first horse races to have been re-
corded in 1171 during the reign of King Henry II by William Fitzstephen, Monk of Canter-
bury. The account was later translated and quoted by Sir John Stow in SURVEY OP LONDON
(1528):
When a race is to be run [at Smithfield Market among hackneys and charging steeds]
by this sort of horses, and perhaps by others which, in their kind, are also strong and
fleet, a shout is imediately raised and the common horses are ordered to withdraw out
of the way. Three jockeys, or sometimes only two, as the match is made, prepare
themselves for the contest .... The horses on their part are not without emulation;
they tremble and are impatient, and are continually in motion. At last, the signal
once given, they start, devour the course, and hurry along with unremitting swiftness.
The jockeys, inspired with the thought of applause and the hope of victory, clap spurs
to their willing horses, brandish their whips, and cheer them with their cries.
R. LONGRIGOG, THE HISTORY OF HORSE RACING 23. (1972). Although interrupted briefly by
King Henry VIII and Oliver Cromwell in 1654, the sport was encouraged and perpetuated
by succeeding English monarchs which eventually led to its being dubbed the "Sport of
Kings." M. DRAGER, THE MOST GLORIOUS CROWN 7 (1975).
2. Attendance, the true barometer of the sport's health, declined for the second consecu-
tive year in 1979. The 1979 attendance figures were less than the 1978 figures, THE AmERi-
CAN RACING MANUAL 216 (1980), the latter having been 0.6% lower than the attendance
figures in 1977. Id. at 214 (1979). Both thoroughbred and harness racing in 1979 attracted
nearly 74 million fans who wagered more than $10.5 billion. Id. at 1038 (1980). This at-
tendance figure represents a sharp decrease from 1976 when over 80 million fans bet more
than $8 billion nationally. Id. at 1023, 1024 (1977). New York State has also shown a signifi-
cant drop in attendance during the past year; over one half million fewer spectators ap-
peared at New York racetracks in 1979 than in 1978. NEW YORK STATE RACING AND WAGER-
ING BOARD - 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 15. See also Klein, Backstretch Blues - Race-Track
Operators Worry About Scandals, Lack of Young Patrons, Wall St. J., June 12, 1980, at 1,
col. 1; Barnes and Florio, Integrity of Racing, Wash. Post, June 25, 1980, at D5, col. 3 [here-
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clining race track attendance and pari-mutuel handle' is reflected
in tax revenue losses4 to states which conduct pari-mutuel wager-
ing on horse racing.5 In addition, the economic impact of decreased
inafter cited as Integrity of Racing]. It appears that the racing industry is not attracting
new, younger fans to replace the average middle-age patron who has been the mainstay of
racing for years. Joseph Kellman of the Illinois Racing Commission recently commented
that "Young people who might be interested in racing read the papers and they read about
drugs and fixed races. Do you think this encourages them to come out to the track? It's bad
enough to lose your money legitimately. The public is just tired of being screwed." Integrity
of Racing, supra, at col. 5.
3. The term "handle" in pari-mutuel parlance refers to the total amount of money wa-
gered on a particular race, daily card (an afternoon's program of racing), or during a race
meeting, season or year. "Pari-mutuel" wagering was originated by a Frenchman, Pierre
Oiler, and literally means to wager "among ourselves." In this type of wagering, winning
bettors receive all the money wagered by the losers, after a percentage is deducted by the
"house" (racetrack/racing association) for acting as agent or "stake-holder" for all the bets.
The percentage deducted is referred to as commission or "take out" and is fixed by state
law. This percentage varies from state to state and in New York is 17% at both thorough-
bred and harness tracks. It is divided at thoroughbred tracks as follows: the state-5%, the
racing association-8.6%, purses-3%, and the breeders fund-.4%. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §
7959 (McKinney Supp. 1979). See generally T. AINSLIE, AINSLIE'S COMPLETE GUIDE TO
THOROUGHBRED RACING 54-62 (1968).
4. Tax revenue to states includes pari-mutuel taxes, track license fees, occupational li-
cense fees, admission taxes, franchise fees and breakage. "Breakage" is the difference be-
tween true mutuel odds and the lesser, rounded amounts given to winning players after
computations have been made deducting state, track and purse percentages from pari-
mutuel pools. THE AMERICAN RACING MANUAL 1039 (1980).
An indication of the dependence of pari-mutuel revenues upon the public's perception of
racing as an honest sport is reflected by the legislative declaration accompanying an amend-
ment to the pari-mutuel revenue law, Ch. 267, § 1, [1977] N.Y. Laws 343:
The legislature further declares that the revenue the state has received from pari-
mutuel betting since its inception has been and is a basic necessity to the support of
the state and local governments, and that the large amount of real estate and school
tax monies paid by the tracks and horse breeding farms is significantly important to
taxpayers in local communities; that the large number of persons employed in the
horse breeding farms' industry, when added to the thousands of people employed in
the many fields of endeavor that provide the horses for tracks and breeding farms,
and by their supportive suppliers, can jointly constitute an intrinsic segment of the
state's economy.
5. Twenty-eight states conduct on-track, pari-mutuel betting on thoroughbred and/or
harness racing and derive revenue there from. These states are: Arizona, Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington
and West Virginia. In addition, New York and Connecticut conduct legalized off-track bet-
ting ("OTB") on races run primarily at New York racetracks. THE AMERICAN RACING MAN-
UAL 1039 (1980). In 1979, New York State realized $30,904,081 in tax revenues from these
OTB operations. NEW YORK STATE RACING & WAGERING BOARD 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 5.
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attendance and handle is felt by racetrack employees. 6 Perhaps the
most significant impact of these declines is upon the quality of the
sport. When pari-mutuel handles are down, racing associations7
cannot offer substantial purses' as inducements to horsemen to
Total pari-mutuel tax revenue to New York State in 1979 amounted to $85,753,409 as
compared to $100,918,276 in 1978, reflecting a 15% decrease. In 1977, the total amounted to
$108, 564,328, reflecting a 7% decrease from 1977 to 1978. THE AMERICAN RACING MANUAL
1040, 1044 (1979). These figures do not include New York State OTB revenues. Although
based upon races run primarily at New York tracks, OTB revenues are not helpful for com-
parison purposes because they do not reflect monies derived from attendance at New York
racetracks.
Most likely to be adversely affected by these declines are the major metropolitan centers
like New York, Chicago and Los Angeles where horseracing is very popular. In Los Angeles,
two major tracks, Hollywood and Santa Anita Parks, generate daily average attendances of
approximately 25,000 with daily average handles of approximately $4 million. Chicago's two
major tracks, Arlington and Sportsman's Parks, account for a daily average attendance of
roughly 11,000 with an average handle of $1.5 million daily. New York's Belmont Park and
Aqueduct race track averaged 17,500 fans daily with an average daily handle of $3.2 million
in 1979. THE AMERICAN RACING MANUAL 224-28 (1980).
6. Trainers, jockeys, stablehands, exercise riders, valets, racing officials, attendants, ush-
ers, food service and maintenance employees, security guards, pari-mutuel tellers and count-
less others depend upon racing to earn a living. In March 1973, the Delafield Commission
(the "Commission") see note 15 infra, summarized its findings on horseracing in a report
issued to the legislature on behalf of New York State Governor Rockefeller. The Commis-
sion concluded that "[h]orseracing is a valuable economic and recreational asset to the State
of New York. The industry directly employs 20,000, generates $200 million in revenue to
government annually, provides entertainment to more patrons than all other professional
sporting events in New York combined and is a vital economic base to many of the State's
communities." REORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF HoRsE RACING IN NEW
YORK STATE 117 (1973) [hereinafter cited as the DELAFIELD COMMISSION REPORT]. In making
its various recommendations, the Commission was cognizant of these facts and concluded
that "[t]he future of horseracing as a sport, employer, and source of government revenue
depends upon the maintenance of high levels of attendance at the tracks." Id. at 124. At
present, thoroughbred racing, for example, provides more than 10,000 jobs and contributes
approximately $1 billion annually to New York State's economy. THE NEW YORK RACING
ASSOCIATION MEDIA GUIDE 6 (1980).
7. The New York Racing Association ("NYRA"), for example, was created by the New
York state legislature in 1955 as a non-profit, non-dividend paying corporation chartered to
conduct thoroughbred racing at Aqueduct, Belmont Park and Saratoga racetracks. It is gov-
erned by a 23 member Board of Trustees who serve without compensation. Board members
are the sole stockholders of NYRA and may sell their shares only to successor trustees at
the original sale price. The state charter also grants NYRA a 25 year franchise on thorough-
bred racing which has been extended through the 1985 racing season. NYRA pays the state
a franchise fee of not less than $30,000 per racing day for the right to conduct races and
offer pari-mutuel wagering. In addition, NYRA must adhere to the rules and regulations of
the New York State Racing and Wagering Board. See Ch. 812, § 1-a, [1955] N.Y. Laws 1211;
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7902 (McKinney 1979).
8. "Purses" are the prize monies awarded to the first four finishers in each race. At New
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race at their tracks, thus threatening the future of quality horse
racing.
The United States Supreme Court recently examined an ap-
proach by the states towards stricter regulation of horse racing and
thereby rescue the sport from its decline. However, the Court in
Barry v. Barchi' upheld the constitutionality of a New York stat-
ute'0 governing, inter alia, administrative hearing procedures for
York thoroughbred tracks, the winner receives 60% of the total purse, the second place
finisher 22%, the third 12% and the fourth 6%. Despite decreasing attendance, purses have
been increasing due to OTB's contribution to New York tracks for their purses. Purse distri-
bution in the United States set a record in 1979 with a gross of $415,414,224. In New York,
where total purse money is the highest in the country, NYRA offered $52,278,250 in purses
during the 1979 racing season. This amount exceeded California's three major tracks' total
purse monies which amounted to $36,611,514. THE AMERICAN RACING MANUAL 218-23 (1980).
Horse owners receive their horse's respective share of the purse distribution. A trainer
generally receives 10% of the horse's distributive share as does the jockey; 10% of a jockey's
winnings is given to his agent for arranging the mount or ride.
9. 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
10. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8022 (McKinney 1979) provides:
If the state harness racing commission shall refuse to grant a license applied for
under this act, or shall revoke or suspend such a license granted by it, or shall impose
a monetary fine upon a participant in harness racing the applicant or licensee or
party fined many demand, within ten days after notice of the said act of the commis-
sion, a hearing before the commission and the commission shall give prompt notice of
a time and place for such hearing at which the commission will hear such applicant or
licensee or party fined in reference thereto. Pending such hearing and final determi-
nation thereon, the action of the commission in refusing to grant or in revoking or
suspending a license or in imposing a monetary fine shall remain in full force and
effect. The commission may continue such hearing from time to time for the conve-
nience of any of the parties. Any of the parties affected by such hearing may be rep-
resented by counsel, and the commission may be represented by the attorney-general,
a deputy attorney-general or its counsel. In the conduct of such hearing the commis-
sion shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence, but all evidence offered before
the commission shall be reduced to writing, and such evidence together with the ex-
hibits, if any, and the findings of the commission, shall be permanently preserved and
shall constitute the record of the commission in such case. In connection with such
hearing, each member of the commission shall have the power to administer oaths
and examine witnesses, and may issue subpoenas to compel attendance of witnesses,
and the production of all material and relevant reports, books, papers, documents,
correspondence and other evidence. The commission may, if occasion shall require, by
order, refer to one or more of its members or officers, the duty of taking testimony in
such matter, and to report thereon to the commission, but no determination shall be
made therein except by the commission. Within thirty days after the conclusion of
such hearing, the commission shall make a final order in writing, setting forth the
reasons for the action taken by it and a copy thereof shall be served on such appli-
cant or licensee or party fined, as the case may be. The action of the commission in
refusing to grant a license or in revoking or suspending a license or in imposing a
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suspended harness licensees. In so holding, the Court failed to con-
sider the recent wave of corruption that has swept the thorough-
bred racing industry, a fact which would certainly have mandated
a different result. This Article will first examine the relevant court
decisions involving license suspensions in horse racing. An evalua-
tion of the corruption present in both the harness and thorough-
bred racing industries will be set forth in Part III. Finally, this
Article will propose legislative amendments to the relevant statu-
tory provisions which should serve to stem the tide of thorough-
bred corruption and help restore the public's confidence in the
sport.
II. Relevant Court Decisions
A. Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Commission
In Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Commission," an owner/
trainer of a thoroughbred racehorse had his license suspended for a
period of forty-seven days following a test which revealed that his
horse had been drugged prior to winning the third race at a West
Virginia track. The owner filed suit in district court challenging a
rule of the West Virginia Racing Commission which prohibits a
stay of any suspension of an owner's or a trainer's license to engage
in horse racing pending a hearing and formal determination of
those responsible for the drugging of a racehorse. Although it was
not disputed that the owner's license as an owner/trainer was a
property right entitled to due process protection, the district court
found that the owner's usual right to notice and hearing before dis-
ciplinary sanctions are applied, was outweighed by important state
interests. Therefore, notice and hearing were permitted to follow
temporary suspension. In affirming the district court's decision, the
Fourth Circuit enunciated the rationale that was to be used later
by state racing commissions across the country as justification for
the suspension of licenses before a final administrative adjudica-
tion had been made:
The state has at least two substantial interests to be served. It has a hu-
monetary fine shall be reviewable in the supreme court in the manner provided by
the provisions of article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules. (footnote
omitted).
11. 513 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975).
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manitarian interest in protecting the health of the horse, and it has a
broader and more weighty interest in protecting the purity of the sport,
both from the standpoint of protecting its own substantial revenues derived
from taxes on legalized pari-mutuel betting and protecting patrons of the
sport from being defrauded. Collectively, these interests, we think, justify
the severe penalty of disqualifying a horse that has been drugged, its trainer
and perhaps its owner, from further participation in legalized racing until
the matter can be heard and determined and an appropriate final sanction
formulated. . . .[I]mmediate suspension without the possibility of stay, de-
ters tampering and promotes care."
B. Barchi v. Sarafan
A similar situation as that in Hubel was presented in Barchi v.
Sarafan.s Barchi, a harness trainer, was accused of having im-
properly treated his horse with a drug in violation of the rules1' of
the New York State Racing and Wagering Board ("Racing
Board").15 Relying upon those presumptions of the Racing Board
which place responsibility upon the trainer in such circum-
stances," the Racing Board suspended Barchi's license17 for fifteen
12. Id. at 243.
13. 436 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afrd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
14. [1974] 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 4120.4 provides in part:
No person shall, or attempt to, or shall conspire with another or other to:
(a) Stimulate or depress a horse through the administration of any drug, medica-
tion, stimulant, depressant, hypnotic or narcotic....
(d) Administer any drug, medicant, stimulant, depressant, narcotic or hypnotic to a
horse within 48 hours of its race.
15. The New York State Racing and Wagering Board ("Racing Board") was created by
the legislature, Ch. 346, § 1, [1973] N.Y. Laws 480, in response to recommendations made in
the Delafield Commission Report. See note 6 supra. Historically referred to as the Delafield
Commission because of its appointed chairman Charles B. Delafield, the Commission recom-
mended the creation of "a single agency ... consolidating and reorganizing the State Rac-
ing (Thoroughbred), Harness Racing, Quarter Horse Racing and Pari-Mutuel Off-Track
Betting Commissions." DELAIE.D COMMISSION REPORT supra note 6, at 126. Qriginally rec-
ommended as the "New York State Racing Board," the legislature expanded the Racing
Board's jurisdiction to include all legalized gambling such as off-track betting, games of
chance and bingo. The Racing Board presently oversees all thoroughbred and harness racing
and had regulated quarter-horse racing until 1978. Its responsibilities include, inter alia: the
approving of New York harness and thoroughbred racing dates; the sanctioning of hunt and
steeplechase meetings in New York; the granting, suspending and revoking of all licenses
issued as well as the conducting of all disciplinary proceedings held in connection with any
rule violations by any licensees. The Racing Board consists of three members appointed by
New York's governor. Each member serves for a six-year appointment.
16. Presumptions. Whenever the test or tests prescribed in section 4120.1 hereof dis-
close the presence in any horse of any drug, stimulant, depressant or sedative, in any
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days.1 8 Notice to Barchi of his suspension was given sixteen days
after the race and after he had undergone two lie-detector tests,
both of which supported his lack of knowledge of the drugging.'
After having been suspended without a hearing Barchi had the op-
tion of filing a notice of appeal with the Racing Board within ten
days of the date of the notice of suspension.20 Had Barchi chosen
to file such notice, however, the original fifteen-day suspension
would have lapsed by the time an administrative hearing could
amount whatsoever, it shall be presumed: (a) that the same was administered by a
person or persons having the control and/or care and/or custody of such horse with
the intent thereby to affect the speed or condition of such horse and the result of the
race in which it participated; (b) that it was administered within the period prohib-
ited by subdivision (d) of section 4120.4 of this Part; and (c) that a sufficient quantity
was administered to affect the speed or condition of such animal. [1974] 9 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 4120.5.
Trainers' responsibility. A trainer shall be responsible at all times for the condition of
all horses trained by him. No trainer shall start a horse or permit a horse in his
custody to be started if he knows, of if [sic] by the exercise of reasonable care he
might have known or have cause to believe, that the horse has received any drug,
stimulant, sedative, depressant, medicine, or other substance that could result in a
positive test. Every trainer must guard or cause to be guarded each horse trained by
him in such manner and for such period of time prior to racing the horse so as to
prevent any person not employed by or connected with the owner or trainer from
administering any drug, stimulant, sedative, depressant, or other substance resulting
in a positive test. Id. § 4120.6.
Trainers' responsibility. A trainer is responsible for the condition, fitness, equipment,
and soundness of each horse at the time it is declared to race and thereafter when it
starts in a race. Id. § 4116.11.
17. Barchi's "trainer-driver" license issued by the Racing Board is peculiar to harness
racing. In thoroughbred racing, two separate and distinct licenses are issued for jockeys and
trainers because a jockey generally does not train the horses he rides. Harness trainers, how-
ever, are often the drivers of their horses. To avoid licensing processing complications, the
Racing Board issues one dual license.
18. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8010(2) (McKinney 1979) provides in part:
The commission may suspend or revoke a license issued pursuant to this section if
it shall determine that (a) the applicant or licensee (1) has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (2) has engaged in bookmaking or other form of illegal
gambling; (3) has been found guilty of any fraud in connection with racing or breed-
ing; (4) has been guilty of any violation or attempt to violate any law, rule or regula-
tion of any racing jurisdiction for which suspension from racing might be imposed in
such jurisdiction; (5) or who has violated any rule, regulation or order of the commis-
sion, or (b) that the experience, character or general fitness of any applicant or licen-
see is such the participation of such person in harness racing or related activities
would be inconsistent with the public interest, convenience or necessity or with the
best interests of racing generally.
19. 436 F. Supp. at 777.
20. See note 10 supra.
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have been scheduled. Instead, Barchi commenced an action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York" to enjoin the enforcement of the suspension. Barchi chal-
lenged section 8022 of the Unconsolidated Laws of New York
("section 8022") 22 on both due process and equal protection
grounds. With respect to the former, he contended that section
8022 permitted the Racing Board to suspend him without granting
him either a pre-suspension or a prompt post-suspension hearing.
The suspension, Barchi argued, can and often does result in the
loss by a trainer of his clientele of owners. During this period of
suspension, owners must hire new trainers because there can be no
hiatus in the care of a racehorse. Owners frequently retain these
newly-acquired trainers after the suspension period has lapsed.28
The monetary damage suffered by a trainer in these circumstances
is significant.24 Therefore, Barchi argued that there was no remedy
at law to recoup this loss of income and clientele, should it be
found at a later administrative hearing that his suspension was im-
properly imposed.'5
The Racing Board countered Barchi's arguments for provisional
relief with the traditional rebuttal employed by state racing com-
missions throughout the country in license suspension situations."
Immediate suspension was necessary, the Racing Board argued, in
order to protect the integrity and reputation of the sport and to
insure public safety:
Historically both the tracks and the State authorities have found it impera-
tive that harness racing be conducted fairly both in fact and in appearance.
21. No. 76-3070 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1976). The action was commenced pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
22. See note 10 supra.
23. Brief for Appellee at 9, Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
24. In addition to a daily fee received by a trainer for his services in caring for and
training horses, a trainer earns a percentage of the purse his horses win in races. Id. See
note 8 supra.
25. Brief for Appellee at 9, Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
26. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
260 [Vol. IX
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In the past, even the appearance of impropriety has resulted in disorders at
the track and jeopardy to the safety of members of the public and the
industry.'
7
Barchi's claim that he would suffer irreparable injury unless
granted provisional relief was sufficient on its face to convince the
district court to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Racing Board from further execution of its suspension decision.2
By staying the enforcement of a Racing Board license suspension,
Barchi had accomplished what few other harness trainers had been
able to do.' e
A three-judge panel in analyzing Barchi's claims began with an
evaluation of whether the nature of a trainer's license entitles the
holder to due process protection. 0 Because the Racing Board's de-
cision to suspend or revoke a license is based upon a determination
of licensee fault or misconduct, the court found that a licensee's
interest warrants such constitutional protection."1 The next consid-
eration in a due process analysis involves the balancing of, inter
alia, the private and governmental interests involved.8 2 Barchi's in-
27. Brief for Appellee at 11, Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (quoting Affidavit of
John M. Dailey, counsel to the New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Aug. 26,
1976)).
28. See Barchi v. Sarafan, 436 F. Supp. at 777.
29. Six months elapsed by the time the Racing Board's motion for dismissal of Barchi's
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was denied and a three-judge court was
convened. The Racing Board urged the three-judge court to abstain from exercising its juris-
diction pending an "authoritative" state interpretation of section 8022. Id. at 778. The dis-
trict court, while acknowledging the doctrine of absention, felt that the constitutionality of
the harness statute was not an open question of state law. In citing Tappis v. New York
State Racing and Wagering Bd., Harness Racing Div., 36 N.Y.2d 862, 331 N.E.2d 697, 370
N.Y.S.2d 922 (1975), the district court determined that the New York Court of Appeals'
decision that the statute sufficiently complied with the requirements of due process was a
conclusive finding of constitutionality. 436 F. Supp. at 779.
30. 436 F. Supp. at 780. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
31. 436 F. Supp. at 780. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Bell v. Bur-
son, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
32. 436 F. Supp. at 780-81. The factors applicable to a due process determination were
set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976):
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration
of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
terest affected by the suspension of his license is the right to a
livelihood."3 On the other hand, New York wishes to ensure that
sports be honestly conducted and that personal injury and prop-
erty damage as a result of rioting after suspicious race results be
avoided."' In addition, the state has a substantial financial interest
at stake.35 In balancing the relative weight of these interests, the
court took notice of the time it presently takes the state to decide
license suspension cases. It was clear that, in Barchi's case, a
prompt hearing could have been conducted within the sixteen days
the state required in imposing its sanctions. Moreover, expediting
such hearings would not overburden the state because the statute
already provides for review hearings.36 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the "absence of either a pre-suspension hearing or a
prompt post-suspension hearing denies plaintiff the meaningful re-
view due process requires. "87
Barchi also alleged that section 8022 denied him equal protec-
tion of the law because the statute prohibits stays of harness li-
cense suspensions pending administrative review, whereas the stat-
utory counterpart for thoroughbred racing suspensions's does not
contain a similar prohibition. The Racing Board argued that the
disparity between the provisions of the two statutes was justifiable
on the ground that harness racing was more susceptible to corrup-
tion than thoroughbred racing.89
requirement would entail.
33. 436 F. Supp. at 781. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
34. 436 F. Supp. at 781.
35. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
36. 436 F. Supp. at 781. See note 10 supra.
37. 436 F. Supp. at 782 (emphasis in original).
38. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 7915(3) (McKinney 1979) provides in part:
No license shall be revoked unless such revocation is at a meeting of the state racing
commission on notice to the licensee, who shall be entitled to a hearing in respect of
such revocation. In the conduct of such hearing the commission shall not be bound by
technical rules of evidence but all evidence offered before the commission shall be
reduced to writing, and such evidence together with the exhibits, if any, and the find-
ings of the commission, shall be permanently preserved and shall constitute the re-
cord of the commission in such case. The action of the commission in refusing, sus-
pending or in revoking a license shall be reviewable in the supreme court in the
manner provided by the provisions of article seventy-eight of the civil practice law
and rules. ...
39. 436 F. Supp. at 783. The Racing Board also contended that, in practice, there is no
difference in treatment between thoroughbred and harness racing because the Racing Board
[Vol. IX
19801 RACE-FIXING 263
In applying the "traditional" equal protection test,40 the court
sought a rational state interest which could justify classifying the
harness racing sector separately from the thoroughbred racing sec-
tor.41 In addition to noting the Racing Board's failure to present
evidence supporting its claim that harness racing was more prone
to corruption or fraudulent manipulation,42 the district court found
the special legislative classification to bear little relation to the
state's purpose: "The grant or denial of a stay is an individual de-
termination. Even if a factually unsupported assertion of greater
corruption in the harness industry is accepted by the Court, there
is no relationship between a stay's availability and such probabili-
ties of corruption. '43 Therefore, the court found the statute to vio-
late the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.4'
can grant stays in the harness industry as a matter of administrative grace. Id. at 782. This
argument was dismissed by the court as being inconsistent with the defendant's previous
due process argument that swift enforcement is essential in regulating harness racing. Id.
40. Id. at 783. This type of equal protection test was applied because § 8022 creates no
suspect classification and involves no fundamental interests. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
41. 436 F. Supp. at 783.
42. Reliance was placed upon Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), to
justify placing this burden upon the state. 436 F. Supp. at 783. The burden was shifted to
Barchi by the Supreme Court. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
43. 436 F. Supp. at 783.
44. A third point raised by Barchi was the constitutionality of the Racing Board's train-
ers' responsibility rules. See note 16 supra. These rules provide that when a post-race test of
a horse reveals the presence of any drug, it is to be presumed, subject to rebuttal, that the
drug was either administered by the trainer or resulted from his negligence in failing to
safeguard against its occurrence. Barchi claimed that the rules violated due process by rea-
son of the lack of a rational connection between the absolute responsibility imposed upon a
trainer and the misconduct to be inferred from the drugging of a horse. The district court
concluded that the rules were not unconstitutional, relying upon the evidentiary presump-
tion's rebuttable nature. The court found a rational connection between the trainer's duty
to oversee his horses and the occurrence of tampering. 436 F. Supp. at 784.
The weight of authority in other states has upheld the constitutionality of rules creating
an irrebuttable presumption of absolute trainer responsibility. See, e.g., Hubel v. West Vir-
ginia Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975); Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing
Bd., 31 Cal. 2d 401, 189 P.2d 17, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948); Harbour v. Colorado
State Racing Comm'n, 31 Colo. App. 471, 505 P.2d 22 (1973); Division of Pari-Mutuel Wa-
gering v. Caple, 362 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1978) (overruling State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin, 159
Fla. 165, 31 So. 2d 627 (1947), which had found the rule unconstitutional); Fioravanti v.
State Racing Comm'n, 375 N.E.2d 722 (Mass. App. 1978); Dare v. State, 159 N.J. Super.
533, 388 A.2d 984 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Jamison v. State Racing Comm'n, 84 N.M.
679, 507 P.2d 426 (1973); O'Daniel v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 37 Ohio St. 2d 87, 307
N.E.2d 529 (1974); State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 133 W. Va. 179, 55
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State racing authorities throughout the country, having adhered
to the Hubel rationale since 1975, 5 were now apprehensive that
the Barchi court's ruling would encourage suspended licensees in
other states to assert similar challenges." Moreover, the court's
holding with respect to New York's license suspension procedures
would likely send repercussions throughout the entire racing ad-
ministrative hearing process because racing suspensions and revo-
cations are reciprocally honored by state racing commissions and
racetracks throughout the country.47 Therefore, the Racing Board
filed an appeal to the United States Supreme Court'8 which, in
March, 1978, noted probable jurisdiction.'
C. Barry v. Barchi
In Barry v. Barchi,0 Barchi's due process challenge of section
8022 was two-pronged. First, he alleged that the statute was un-
constitutional because it permitted his license to be suspended
S.E.2d 263 (1949). Contra, Brennan v. Illinois Racing Bd., 42 Ill. 2d 352, 247 N.E.2d 881
(1969); Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81, 48 A.2d 600 (1946) (slightly modified strict liability
rule approved in Maryland Racing Comm'n v. McGee, 212 Md. 69, 128 A.2d 419 (1957)). See
generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 206 (1973); Note, Brennan v. Illinois Racing Board: The Va-
lidity of Statutes Making a Horse Trainer the Absolute Insurer for the Condition of his
Horse, 74 DICK. L. REV. 303 (1970).
A concurring opinion filed by Judge Griesa in Barchi suggested an amendment to § 8022
similar in some respects to that proposed in this Article. See notes 92-103 infra and accom-
panying text. The opinion stated that the statute would not be unconstitutional if the "pro-
hibition of stays" provision was eliminated or
replaced with a provision allowing the Board to have the discretion to grant a stay
pending a hearing. This means that the statute would be constitutionally proper if it
granted the Board the discretion to impose pre-hearing sanctions, if this were coupled
with the discretion to stay such sanctions pending a hearing.
436 F. Supp. at 785 (Griesa, J., concurring).
45. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
46. Many at the New York State Racing and Wagering Board, as well as those in the
harness racing industry, felt that Barchi would cause a flood of hearing requests at the
Racing Board. Interview with Joseph Faraldo, Plaintiff-Appellee's counsel in Barchi, in New
York City (Sept. 15, 1980).
47. Hoffheimer, Horse-Racing Tips for Lawyers, 50 A.B.A. L.J. 250, 251 (1964). See
Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240, 242 n.4 (4th Cir. 1975).
48. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review the three-judge court's decision is con-
ferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976). See MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 804 (1975).
49. 435 U.S. 921 (1978). Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by the Har-
ness Horsemen International, Inc., the Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Association
and the Jockeys' Guild, Inc. The amicus brief filed by NYRA urged either reversal or ab-
stention until the statute was interpreted by the New York state courts.
50. 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
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without granting him a prior hearing. Second, he claimed that his
due process rights were violated because the statute prohibited
stays of summary suspensions pending administrative review. As in
the district court, the state predicated its argument on its interest
in preserving the integrity of horse racing and in protecting the
public from harm. The Supreme Court held that the due process
clause did not require the holding of an evidentiary hearing prior
to the effectuation of Barchi's suspension:
[Tihe State is entitled to impose an interim suspension, pending a prompt
judicial or administrative hearing that would definitely determine the is-
sues, whenever it has satisfactorily established probable cause to believe
that a horse has been drugged and that a trainer has been at least negligent
in connection with the drugging."
However, the Court found that the statute was unconstitutionally
applied to Barchi insofar as he did not receive a prompt post-sus-
pension hearing:
Once suspension has been imposed, the trainer's interest in a speedy resolu-
tion of the controversy becomes paramount. . . . [There is] little or no state
interest. . . in an appreciable delay in going forward with a full hearing. On
the contrary, it would seem as much in the State's interest as Barchi's to
have an early and reliable determination with respect to the integrity of
those participating in state-supervised horse racing.
2
Barchi's second argument, that a statutory scheme that prohib-
its stays of revocations or suspensions for harness racing but not
for thoroughbred racing licensees denies harness licensees equal
protection of the law, was rejected by the Court."s The Court an-
nounced the standard to be applied in determining whether a stat-
utory classification violates the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment: "[T]he varying treatment of different groups
or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination
of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legisla-
ture's actions were irrational. ' 54 It was incumbent upon Barchi to
demonstrate that the acute problems attending harness racing also
51. Id. at 64. The trainers' responsibility rules, see note 16 supra, provided the probable
cause that Barchi was at least negligent.
52. 443 U.S. at 66.
53. Id. at 68.
54. Id. at 67 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
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plague the thoroughbred racing industry6" and that the two indus-
tries should be identically regulated in all respects.6 The Court
found that Barchi had failed to sustain this burden of proof.
57
Moreover, the Court's examination of the legislative history of sec-
tion 8022 revealed that the disparate treatment was justifiable be-
cause harness racing is more susceptible to corruption. 8 The Court
concluded that the statute's prohibition of stays was rationally re-
lated to the state's goal of mitigating the threats to the public in-
terest arising in harness racing. Therefore, the Court reversed that
part of the district court's decision which declared section 8022 un-
constitutional under the equal protection clause.' 9
55. Id. at 67 n.12.
56. Id.
57. In contrast to the district court, see note 42 supra and accompanying text, the Su-
preme Court placed the burden upon Barchi to show that "'the legislative facts on which
the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker.'" 443 U.S. at 67-68 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
111 (1979)).
58. See notes 60-68 infra and accompanying text.
59. The Court did not decide the issue whether "the procedures under § 8022, as that
section may have been modified by . ... [N.Y. State Admin. Proc. Act § 401(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1979)], satisfy the strictures of the Due Process Clause . ..[because § ] 401(3) did
not take effect until . . . two months after Barchi was suspended." 443 U.S. at 68-69 n.13.
For a discussion of the effect of this legislation upon § 8022, see notes 81-91 infra and
accompanying text.
The Court also did not address the district court's holding that the rebuttable presump-
tion of trainer responsibility is constitutional. See note 44 supra. "[A]ppellee did not cross-
appeal, and he is not to be heard upon the challenge to that holding made in his brief, since
agreement with that challenge would result in greater relief than was awarded him by the
District Court." 443 U.S. at 69 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Stevens, concurred in part with
the judgment of the majority. Justice Brennan would not have reached the questions
whether due process required a pre-suspension hearing and whether the difference between
the procedures in harness and thoroughbred racing violates the equal protection clause. This
position was based upon the "in the alternative" phrasing of the district court's judgment,
see text accompanying note 37 supra, the absence of a cross-appeal by Barchi, and the
"possibly significant changes in the procedures applicable to all future suspensions" by
reason of N.Y. STATE ADMIN. PRoc. AcT § 401(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979). 443 U.S. at 72, 74.
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan remarked that "[tihe record in this case, in my view, raises
serious doubts that the alleged state interests in this context are sufficient to justify post-
poning a trainer's hearing until after his suspension." 443 U.S. at 73 n.5. It is contended
that public policy concerns dictate the necessity of summary suspensions in cases involving
allegedly egregious conduct in horse racing. See text accompanying notes 98-103 infra.
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III. Corruption in Horse Racing: A Reevaluation of the
Equal Protection Analysis
The Supreme Court in Barry rejected Barchi's equal protection
challenge to section 8022 based upon twenty-five year-old legisla-
tive findings that the harness racing industry was especially prone
to corruption. An examination of those findings will be set forth,
followed by a discussion of the recent developments in thorough-
bred racing corruption.
A. The Moreland Commission
In 1953, Governor Thomas E. Dewey established a commission
(the "Moreland Commission")" to investigate the pari-mutuel har-
ness racing industry following the murder of the president of a
harness employees union." The Moreland Commission investi-
gated the following areas: first, the printing and distribution of
race track programs at Roosevelt Raceway on Long Island; second,
the health and welfare fund of the harness employees union; and
third, all aspects of pari-mutuel harness racing in New York
State."s In its report to Governor Dewey, the Moreland Commis-
sion reached the following conclusions: 1) a judge of the County
Court, Nassau County, had an interest in a concern which previ-
ously had printed the Roosevelt Raceway programs; 3 2) there was
60. Members were appointed to the commission under the provisions of N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§ 6 (McKinney 1972), also known as the Moreland Act:
The governor is authorized at any time, either in person or by one or more persons
appointed by him for the purpose, to examine and investigate the management and
affairs of any department, board, bureau or commission of the state. The governor
and the persons so appointed by him are empowered to subpoena and enforce the
attendance of witnesses, to administer oaths and examine witnesses under oath and
to require the production of any books or papers deemed relevant or material. When-
ever any person so appointed shall not be regularly in the service of the state his
compensation for such services shall be fixed by the governor and said compensation
and all necessary expenses of such examinations and investigations shall be paid from
the treasury out of any appropriations made for the purpose upon the order of the
governor and the audit and warrant of the comptroller. ...
Id.
61. Report of the New York State Commission to Study, Examine and Investigate State
Agencies in Relation to Pari-Mutuel Harness Racing, reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF
THOMAS E. DEWEY 505 (1954).
62. Id. at 506-07.
63. Id. at 507-08.
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"shocking" waste and mismanagement of the union local's fund;""
and 3) "unless prompt steps were taken, pari-mutuel harness rac-
ing . . . might be jeopardized, with consequent loss of substantial
revenue by the State." 5 The investigation disclosed that harness
racing had become "a lush and attractive field for every kind of
abuse.""' As a result of these findings, section 8022 was amended 67
to prohibit the granting of a stay pending a hearing and final de-
termination of a license suspension or revocation proceeding. Any
appearance of impropriety would be avoided by such a provision.
Strict regulation was necessary to prevent further abuses and "to
meet a unique situation which does not exist anywhere else in
government." s
B. Thoroughbred Corruption
It became evident during the 1970's that thoroughbred racing
was not immune from corruption. Tony Ciulla, a so-called "mas-
termind" of race-fixing, was convicted in 1975 of fixing thorough-
bred races and received a four to six year prison sentence."' In re-
turn for relocation, a new identity and immunity from further
prosecution, Ciulla agreed to cooperate with the United States De-
partment of Justice in its prosecution of other individuals involved
in racing corruption. In the course of testifying at grand jury inves-
tigations and race-fixing trials, Ciulla admitted to having fixed lit-
erally hundreds of thoroughbred races at thirty-nine tracks
throughout the country."'
The Justice Department's Organized Crime Task Force began its
64. Id. at 509.
65. Id. at 511.
66. N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 86, 177th Sess., 3, 4 (1954).
67. Ch. 510, § 8, [1954] N.Y. Laws 650.
68. N.Y. Gov. Mess. on Harness Racing, reprinted in [1954] N.Y. Laws 1397
(McKinney).
69. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 1978, at 29.
70. The payoffs received by Ciulla from fixing these races were enormous. On August 16,
1973, Ciulla collected $35,000 on one fixed race in Detroit. One month later he won $65,000,
also on just one race. It appears that one of Ciulla's favorite schemes was to fix the favorite
in the race and then bet all the possible combinations on the remaining horses in exacta or
triple type of bets. Integrity of Racing, supra note 2, at 1 col. 3. In an exacta type of bet,
one must pick the two horses in one race finishing first and second in exact order in order to
win. In triple wagering, one must pick the horses that finish first, second,,and third in exact
order.
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investigation of race-fixing schemes in 1973.71 Because the investi-
gations revealed that these schemes have been conducted on a
grand scale, indictments and convictions have continued through
today. In July 1979, twenty-one individuals, including jockeys,
trainers and organized crime figures, were indicted for fixing races
at New England tracks. The majority of them either pleaded guilty
or were convicted. 71 In April 1980, fifteen racing figures were in-
dicted for rigging races at Pocono Downs in Wilkes-Barre, Penn-
sylvania; six individuals were subsequently convicted .7 As recently
as October 1980, several individuals involved in Kentucky thor-
oughbred racing were indicted for conspiring to fix races at race-
tracks in Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Illinois and
Massachusetts. 4
Information obtained in May 1980 during the trial of a former
jockey, who was ultimately found guilty of bribing other jockeys,'7
suggested the extent of thoroughbred corruption in New York. Ap-
pearing as a government witness, Jos6 Amy, a well-known New
York jockey, mentioned ten of the nation's leading jockeys76 in
connection with alleged race-fixing schemes. Three separate inves-
tigations of individuals alleged by Amy to have been involved in
71. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 1973, at 26.
72. Eight individuals pleaded guilty, one was found not guilty and four individuals re-
main fugitives. There was one dismissal. The seven who were convicted were: Howard T.
Winter, Melvin Goldenberg, Elliot Paul Price, James DeMetri, Charles DeMetri, James
Martorano and Sidney Tiltaley. No. 79-42MA (D. Mass., filed July 11, 1979). Six of the
seven are appealing their convictions. Telephone interview with Judy Dobkin, Justice De-
partment Organized Crime Task Force attorney, Chicago, Illinois (Oct. 27, 1980).
73. The convicted individuals were: Joseph Sciandra, Paul Whiteman, Ronald Scott, Lu-
cien Parent, Vernon Ewalt and Guy Tumminello. No. 79-50 (M.D. Pa., filed Apr. 3, 1980).
Four individuals pleaded guilty while three remain fugitives. In addition, there were two
dismissals. Telephone interview with Judy Dobkin, Justice Department Organized Crime
Task Force attorney, Chicago, Illinois (Oct. 27, 1980).
74. The individuals indicted were Charles Lee Wonder, William Morgan Combee, Burley
Clouston II and Burley Clouston III. No. 80-00230 (W.D. Ky., filed Oct. 9, 1980). Telephone
interview with Fred Partin, Assistant United States Attorney, Western District of Ken-
tucky, Owensboro, Kentucky (Oct. 28, 1980).
75. Con Errico was found guilty by a New York jury of bribing jockeys in a scheme to fix
nine races at Aqueduct and Saratoga in 1974 and 1975. He was fined $25,000 and sentenced
to 10 years in prison. United States v. Con Errico, No. 80-137 (E.D.N.Y., filed May 19,
1980).
76. Amy revealed the names of several leading money-winning New York jockeys, in-
cluding Jorge Velasquez, Jacinto Vasquez and Angel Cordero, Jr. Integrity of Racing, supra
note 2, at col. 5.
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these schemes are currently being conducted."
The findings made by the Moreland Commission in 1954 in con-
nection with corruption in harness racing78 were only tangential to
the actual conduct of the sport. In contrast, the indictments and
convictions for thoroughbred race-fixing are directly related to the
running of races and to pari-mutuel wagering. It appears now that,
at a minimum, the "acute problems attending harness racing also
plague the thoroughbred racing industry. '79 The fact that the
number of fixed thoroughbred races is said to be in the hundreds8"
obviates the previous justification for disparate treatment of har-
ness and thoroughbred licensees.
IV. A Legislative Analysis
In view of the recent evidence of corruption in the thoroughbred
industry, Barchi's equal protection claim carries is more significant
today than it was when first presented in Barry. More importantly,
it has become imperative to impose some form of stricter regula-
tion upon horse racing in order to rescue the sport from any fur-
ther decline. In this section, the effect, if any, of the State Admin-
istrative Procedure Act upon section 8022 suspension procedures
will be discussed. In addition, a series of legislative amendments
will be proposed which should serve not only to rectify the equal
protection problem posed by section 8022 but also to ameliorate
the ailing horse racing industry.
A. The State Administrative Procedure Act
The State Administrative Procedure Act ("SAPA")s1 was en-
acted in 1975 "to provide uniform procedures for administrative
77. The United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York, the New
York State Racing and Wagering Board and the New York Racing Association are inter-
viewing jockeys, trainers, owners and other racing figures in order to establish whether any
other information can be obtained for possible future indictments. Interview with Sal Curi-
ale, Counsel to the New York Racing and Wagering Board, in New York City (Oct. 22,
1980).
78. See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
79. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 67.
80. Interview with Paul Coffey, deputy chief of the Justice Department Organized Crime
Division, in New York City (Oct. 22, 1980). See Integrity of Racing, supra note 2, at D5, col.
3 ("Never has there been any series of prosecutions of this magnitude in the history of
sports.").
81. Ch. 167, § 1, [19751 N.Y. Laws 226 (eff. Sept. 1, 1976).
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rule-making, hearings and the issuance of licenses by State agen-
cies."'8 2 Section 401(3) of SAPA provides the state with the author-
ity to summarily suspend a license if the "public health, safety, or
welfare imperatively requires emergency action. . . ,, 8 The ques-
tion whether this SAPA provision is applicable to the suspension
provisions of section 7915 of the thoroughbred racing statute was
apparently answered in Gerard v. Barry.4 There, the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court nullified a Racing Board
order summarily suspending a veterinarian's license to practice
medicine at racetracks on the ground that the Racing Board had
not made "any finding that the public health, safety, or welfare
imperatively required such emergency action as a suspension prior
to a hearing."'" The Racing Board in Barry contended that the
Appellate Division mistakenly applied the requirements of section
401(3) of SAPA to the Gerard case.8 The provisions of Article
Four of SAPA apply "when licensing is required by statute to be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing." 87 Under the li-
censing provisions of section 7915,"' there is no requirement of
prior notice and hearing. Likewise, section 801089 of the harness
82. Memorandum of Gov., reprinted in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1742.
83. If the agency finds that public health, safety, or welfare imperatively requires
emergency action, and incorporates a finding to that effect in its order, summary sus-
pension of a license may be ordered, effective on the date specified in such order or
upon service of a certified copy of such order on the licensee, whichever shall be later,
pending proceedings for revocation or other action. These proceedings shall be
promptly instituted and determined.
N.Y. STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 401(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
84. 59 A.D.2d 901 (2d Dep't 1977), appeal dismissed, 44 N.Y.2d 729, 376 N.E.2d 932,
405 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1978).
85. 59 A.D.2d at 901.
86. Brief for Appellant at 9, Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
87. N.Y. STATE ADMIN. PROC. AcT. § 401(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
88. If the state racing commission shall find that the financial responsibility, experi-
ence, character and general fitness of the applicant are such that the participation of
such person will be consistent with the public interest, convenience or necessity and
with the best interests of racing generally in conformity with the purposes of this act,
it shall thereupon grant a license. If the commission shall find that the applicant fails
to meet any of said conditions, it shall not grant such license and it shall notify the
applicant of the denial.
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7915(2) (McKinney 1979).
89. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8010(2) (McKinney 1979) provides in part:
If the state harness racing commission shall find that the experience, character and
general fitness of the applicant are such that the participation of such person in har-
ness horse race meets will be consistent with the public interest, convenience and
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statute does not require licensing to be preceded by notice and an
opportunity for a hearing. Therefore, it would appear that SAPA
does not apply to license suspensions in harness and thoroughbred
racing.
The New York Court of Appeals has not yet specifically ad-
dressed the applicability of SAPA to suspensions in the thorough-
bred industry. Nevertheless, the procedures under section 8022,
even if modified by SAPA, would still result in an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection of the laws and would fail to resolve ade-
quately the problems plaguing horse racing for two reasons. First, a
thoroughbred licensee could still procure a section 7915 adminis-
trative stay following a summary suspension under SAPA section
401(3) whereas a harness licensee could not. Second, SAPA re-
quires the agency to make a "public welfare" finding in order to
justify summary suspension of a license. Although the Racing
Board would contend that the participation of a "drugged" horse
in a race is anathema to honest horse racing, thereby reflecting a
finding of public welfare,9" there remain other instances suggesting
corruption such as indictments for race-fixing which may not sat-
isfy this "public welfare" standard. 1 These allegedly corrupt prac-
tices prove equally damaging to the sport's integrity. Reliance
upon SAPA's effect, if any, upon the presently deficient statutory
procedures would therefore be misplaced. Legislative amendments
are needed to remedy the situation.
B. A Statutory Proposal
The Supreme Court in Barry implicitly suggested that any con-
stitutional problems arguably presented by section 8022 could be
addressed by the New York state legislature. The Court noted that
section 8010(2) of the harness statute has "engendered a clear ex-
pectation of continued enjoyment of a license absent proof of cul-
necessity and with the best interests of racing generally in conformity with the pur-
poses of this act, it may thereupon grant a license.
Id. (footnote omitted).
90. Brief for Appellants at 19 n.*, Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
91. Although the Racing Board would make the argument that a race-fixing indictment
would endanger the public safety so as to require emergency summary suspension, the "pub-
lic welfare" standard places a substantial burden of proof on the state. Indeed, the Racing
Board was unable to meet this burden in Gerard.
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pable conduct.... 92 In other words, a licensee's property inter-
est in his license is derived from state law.93 Relying upon the
language of Board of Regents v. Roth,94 the Court appeared to in-
dicate that where a state statute by its terms creates rights", and
circumscribes remedies, e" the holder of such rights is entitled only
to such due process as is granted thereunder.9 7
Therefore, it appears that the procedures in license suspension
proceedings could be further circumscribed by legislative amend-
ment in order to preserve the integrity of the sport. Both the har-
92. 443 U.S. at 64 n.11.
93. For a similar discussion of Barchi's property interest, see id. at 70 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part).
94. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Roth defined the nature of property interests as follows:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
95. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 7915(1), 7915(2), 8010 (McKinney 1979).
96. See id. §§ 7915(3), 8022.
97. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972); Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916,
922 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Considerable weight is given to whether the alleged liberty interest is in
the nature of 'a bird in the hand' rather than one in the bush."); Thompson v. Bass, 616
F.2d 1259, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980); Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 1980);
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. v. Village of Arlington Hts., 616 F.2d 1006, 1018 (7th Cir. 1980);
Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 447 (2d Cir. 1980); McCarthy
v. Cortland County Community Action Program, 487 F. Supp. 333, 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
Individuals who are discharged oftentimes argue that the reasons given for such action stig-
matize the individual and damage his or her reputation in the community. When a govern-
mental discharge imposes a stigma and restricts the individual's ability to seek and obtain
employment, such action may be a deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. The argument that a summary suspension upon indictment for a racing-related
offense creates a "stigma plus," Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976); Webster v. Red-
mond, 599 F.2d 793, 799-801 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 712 (1980); Blank v.
Swan, 487 F. Supp. 452, 455 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Scotto v. Waterfront Comm'n, - A.D.2d
- -. 425 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (1st Dep't 1980), thereby requiring procedural due pro-
cess protections, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573; Wahba v. New York Univ., 492
F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Jones v. Kneller, 482 F. Supp. 204, 210
(E.D.N.Y. 1979), is without merit. The indictment, not the summary suspension, creates the
stigma. As long as a mechanism is available whereby an individual has "an opportunity to
refute the charge . . .[and] to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name," Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 n.12, a suspended individual's due process rights are
satisfied. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977); Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954, 959-63
(7th Cir. 1978).
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ness and thoroughbred sections" of the statute should be amended
to provide that a licensee who is indicted" for a racing-related
crime'00 could have his license summarily suspended by the Racing
Board. By including a racing-related indictment as an additional
ground for summary suspension or revocation of a license, the state
would be furthering its "important interest in assuring the integ-
rity of racing carried on under its auspices.""1 ' No equal protection
problem would arise because the amendment would be applicable
to both the harness and thoroughbred industries.
The "prohibition of stay" provision found in section 8022102
seeks to avoid the appearance of impropriety in horse racing and
should apply in instances where egregious conduct could threaten
racing's integrity. These circumstances include convictions for
crimes involving moral turpitude, fraudulent racing or breeding
practices, bookmaking activities, as well as indictments for racing-
related crimes. With respect to suspensions for racing-related in-
dictments, the proposed amendment should additionally provide
that the licensee could not be reinstated until the charges are dis-
posed of or the licensee exculpates himself at a prompt post-sus-
pension administrative hearing. In view of the corruption which
exists in the entire racing industry, there is no longer any justifica-
tion for disparate treatment of harness and thoroughbred licensees.
98. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8010(2), 7915(2) (McKinney 1979).
99. An indictment, although only a formal charge, is nevertheless based upon some evi-
dence. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.65(1) (McKinney 1971). Similarly, the Supreme Court in
Barry concluded that "[alt the interim suspension stage, an expert's affirmance [of a posi-
tive drug finding], although untested and not beyond error, would appear sufficiently relia-
ble to satisfy constitutional requirements." 443 U.S. at 65.
100. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.50 (McKinney 1975) which provides:
A person is guilty of tampering with a sports contest when, with intent to influence
the outcome of a sports contest, he tampers with any sports participant, sports official
or with any animal or equipment or other thing involved in the conduct or operation
of a sports contest in a manner contrary to the rules and usages purporting to govern
such a contest.
Tampering with a sports contest is a class A misdemeanor.
See also 18 U.S.C. § 224(a) (1976) which provides:
Whoever carries into effect, attempts to carry into effect, or conspires with any other
person to carry into effect any scheme in commerce to influence, in any way, by brib-
ery any sporting contest, with knowledge that the purpose of such scheme is to influ-
ence by bribery that contest, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
101. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 64.
102. See note 10 supra.
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Therefore, section 7915 of the thoroughbred statute should be
amended to add a "prohibition of stay" provision so that it would
be in harmony with its counterpart in harness racing.
Other infractions that occur in horse racing'03 do not have the
same adverse effect upon the integrity of the sport as do the seri-
ous violations just enumerated. In suspension or revocation pro-
ceedings involving these relatively minor infractions, there is no
need for a mandatory provision prohibiting stays. Rather, the
amended sections should provide that the decision whether to
grant or deny a stay should remain within the Racing Board's
discretion.
V. Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court adequately addressed the due pro-
cess issue presented in Barry, the Court's disposition of Barchi's
equal protection claim is no longer viable. Since the Court's deci-
sion, information has surfaced indicating that corruption exists in
the thoroughbred racing industry. That the twenty-six year-old
103. See, e.g., [1974] 19 N.Y.C.R.R. § 4035.2 which provides:
Foul riding penalized. (a) When clear, a horse may be taken to any part of the
course provided that crossing or weaving in front of contenders may constitute inter-
ference or intimidation for which the offender may be disciplined.
. (b) A horse crossing another so as actually to impede him is disqualified, unless the
impeded horse was partly in fault or the crossing was wholly caused by the fault of
some other horse or jockey.
(c) If a horse or jockey jostle another horse, the aggressor may be disqualified, un-
less the impeding horse or his jockey was partly in fault or the jostle was wholly
caused by the fault of some other horse or jockey.
(d) If a jockey wilfully strike another horse or jockey or ride wilfully or carelessly so
as to injure another horse, which is in no way in fault, or so as to cause other horses
to do so, his horse is disqualifed.
(e) When a horse is disqualifed under this section every horse in the same race
belonging wholly or partly to the same owner, in the discretion of the stewards, may
be disqualifed.
(f) Complaints under this section can only be received from the owner, trainer or
jockey of the horse alleged to be aggrieved and must be made to the clerk of the
scales or to the stewards before or immediately after his jockey has passed the scales.
But nothing in this section shall prevent the stewards taking cognizance of foul
riding.
(g) Any jockey against whom a foul is claimed shall be given the opportunity to
appear before the stewards before any decision is made by them.
(h) A jockey whose horse has been disqualified or who unnecessarily causes his
horse to shorten his stride with a view to complaint, or an owner, trainer or jockey
who complains frivolously that his horse was crossed or jostled, may be punished.
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Moreland Commission findings should still mandate the statutory
denial of an administrative stay only in harness racing in view of
the recent disclosures of thoroughbred corruption would appear to
affront any notions of equal protection.
Unless immediate remedial steps are taken by the state legisla-
ture, the "Sport of Kings" could become the "Sport of Thieves."
Although the proposed legislative amendments would limit the
ability of suspended racing licensees to continue their occupations
at racetracks pending an administrative or judicial review, these
amendments are the desperately needed initial step towards
stricter regulation by the state. 104 With their passage, the racing
104. The economic health of the racing industry and the tax revenues it generates de-
pend on its acceptance by the public as a fair and honest sport. See Brief for Appellants at
16, Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979). See also note 4 supra. A number of states have
enacted statutes designed to achieve this purpose, including provisions for summary suspen-
sions in cases of suspected violations of law or racing rules. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-
60-105 (3), 24-4-104(4) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 550.10(4)(b) (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 8, § 37-16 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (includes "prohibition of stay" provision); Ky.
REV. STAT. §§ 230.320, 230.720 (1977) ("prohibition of stay" provisions in both thoroughbred
and harness industries); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2618 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (includes "pro-
hibition of stay" provision in harness industry). But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3769.091
(Page 1980) (appeal to commission shall stay suspension until further action by the commis-
sion); W. VA. CODE §§ 19-23-15 to 16 (1977) (demand for hearing operates automatically to
stay or suspend execution of order suspending or revoking license).
There are bills currently pending in the United States House of Representatives and Sen-
ate which would prevent the use of any medication or therapeutic method of alleviating pain
in horses participating in a race. The bill recommending passage of the Corrupt Horse Rac-
ing Practices Act of 1980 provides in part:
Sec. 3. The Congress finds that-
(1) the practice of drugging or numbing a race horse prior to a horse race-
(A) corrupts the integrity of the sport of horse racing and promotes criminal
fraud in such sports,
(B) misleads the wagering public and those desiring to purchase such horse
as to the condition and ability of such horse,
(C) poses an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death to the rider of such
horse and to the riders of other horses competing in the same race, and
(D) is cruel and inhumane to the horse so drugged or numbed;
(2) the practice of drugging or numbing a race horse adversely affects and burdens
interstate commerce; and
(3) criminal penalties and other sanctions are necessary in order to prevent and
eliminate such practices.
Sec. 4. The following conduct is prohibited:
(1) the entering of a horse in a horse race by the trainer or owner of such horse if
such trainer or owner knows of if [sic] by the exercise of reasonable care such trainer
or owner should know that such horse is drugged or numbed;
(2) the drugging or numbing of a race horse with knowledge or with reason to be-
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industry would be in a better position to ensure public confidence
and regain the integrity the sport vitally needs to maintain its
place as a valuable economic and recreational asset to the State of
New York.
lieve that such horse will compete in a horse race while so drugged or numbed; Pro-
vided, That the Administrator may by regulation establish permissible trace levels of
substances foreign to the natural horse that he determines to be innocuous;
(3) the willful failure by the operator of a horse racing facility to disqualify a horse
from competing in a horse race if such operator has, in accordance with section 6(a)
of this Act, been notifed that such horse is drugged or numbed, or was not properly
made available for tests or inspections as required under such section, and
(4) the willful failure by the operator of a horse racing facility to prohibit a horse
from racing if such operator has, in accordance with section 5(f) of this Act, been
notified that such horse has been suspended from racing....
(b) Disqualification of Offenders.-(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, any person who violates any provision of this Act, upon conviction
thereof, by order of the Administrator, be disqualifed from entering a horse in a horse
race, operating a horse racing facility, or performing for gain any service rendered in
connection with horse racing, for a period not to exceed one year.
(2) Any person who violates any provision of this Act and who has been previously
convicted for a violation of such Act shall, by order of the Administrator, be dis-
qualifed from entering a horse in a horse race, operating a horse racing facility, or
performing for gain any service rendered in connection with horse racing, for a period
not to exceed five years....
(d) Suspension of Horse from Racing.-(1) Any race horse found to have been
drugged or numbed in violation of this Act shall, subject to paragraph (2) of this
subsection, be suspended from competing in any horse race for a period of six months
for the first infraction, and for a period of not less than twelve months for each subse-
quent infraction.
(2) No race horse shall be suspended under paragraph (1) of this subsection unless
the owner of such horse is given notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the
Administrator within two weeks after the date on which the infraction referred to in
such paragraph is discovered. ...
(e) Notification of Suspensions and Disqualifications.-Notification of all suspen-
sions and disqualifications under this section shall be transmitted to the operator of
each horse racing facility in accordance with such procedures as the Administrator
shall by regulation prescribe....
S.2636, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
This bill was introduced in the 96th Congress and had twenty-two co-sponsors in the
House of Representatives and five in the Senate. Telephone interview with Arnold Kirkpat-
rick, Executive Secretary of the Racing Advisory Committee, American Horse Council,
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 30, 1980).

